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As the Ken Murray debacle has painfully shown, questions about ethical standards 
for lawyers may be complex even with respect to “traditional” lawyering. 
Increasingly, however, lawyers are engaged in the less traditional setting of 
mediation, both as representatives of clients and as mediators. This development has 
raised fresh issues about ethics in the mediation context. Should the ethical 
standards governing lawyers engaged in mediation on behalf of their clients, in their 
conduct with respect to their own clients, to the mediator and to the other parties, 
differ from those which apply in the traditional adversarial context and if so, how? 
should mediators be governed by a code of ethics and if so, promulgated by whom? 
what ethical standards govern the mediator? to whom are the obligations owed? and 
does it matter whether the mediator is a lawyer?
These questions, particularly those about lawyer-mediators, have been the 
subject of vigorous debate in the American academic literature. My intention here 
is to provide a quick “Canadian take” on some of these issues.1 I first consider the 
lawyer as representative and then the lawyer as mediator, the latter of which appears 
to raise the most debate. Modifying the usual rules to accommodate the lawyer’s 
representative role is perhaps more easily accomplished than is the identification of 
the appropriate ethical obligations of the lawyer-mediator and the proper governing 
authority.
The Lawyer as “Advocate” in Mediation
I use the term “advocate” here because regardless of the differences between the 
principles underlying mediation and those underlying traditional litigation, the 
principle that the lawyer is her or his client’s advocate does not change. It is how
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1 This is hardly a new discussion: see A.J. Pirie, ‘The Lawyer as Mediator: Professional Responsibility 
Problems or Profession Problems?” (1985) 63 C.B.R. 378. But I suggest the issue has become more 
urgent as a result of the rapid spread of both voluntaiy and mandatory mediation.
the principle is realized which compels us to consider whether the traditional rules 
are a good “fit” with the lawyer’s representative role in mediation. Of course, 
lawyers have always been involved in representing their clients in settlement 
contexts, particularly negotiation or court-sponsored settlement conferences. Until 
relatively recently, however, most lawyers viewed the basic approach they should 
adopt in these situations as little different from that which they take in the 
courtroom. This remains perhaps more true of negotiation than of mediation which 
is premised on very different principles. The realization of mediation’s potential as 
a distinct form of dispute resolution requires a “mind-set” in lawyers which differs 
from that which they are accustomed to exercising in the courtroom.
Thus in mediation lawyers are expected to take a co-operative rather than 
adversarial stance and a mutual problem-solving approach rather than one focussing 
more completely on their own client’s position. Nevertheless, mediation is very 
much part of the lawyer’s advocacy function on behalf of a particular client or 
clients. Indeed, rules of professional conduct for lawyers may now go beyond the 
traditional general admonition to encourage settlement in the same breath as 
avoiding frivolous or otherwise inappropriate litigation,2 to requiring lawyers to 
consider and, where appropriate, propose to their clients various forms of “ADR.”3
There is probably no disagreement that advocates representing individual clients 
in mediation, ought to be subject to the codes of conduct governing lawyers. The 
issue is whether, given the different approach mediation anticipates, they ought to 
be subject to different ethical expectations or at least to a clearer statement of how 
the existing rules apply to the mediation context. I suggest that we need to think 
more carefully about how the current rules apply to this different way of “doing 
law.”
Some codes of conduct, such as Alberta’s, explicitly establish that the same rules 
apply in negotiation as in other representational contexts. The commentary to
2 Chapter 3, Rule 6 of Saskatchewan’s Code of Professional Conduct is typical: “The lawyer should 
advise and encourage the client to compromise or settle a dispute whenever possible on a reasonable 
basis and should discourage the client from commencing or continuing useless proceedings.”
3 See, for example, Rule 10.2A of the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society Legal Ethics and Professional 
Conduct Handbook which requires lawyers to “consider the appropriateness of alternate dispute 
resolution (ADR) to the resolution of issues in every case and, if appropriate, the lawyer should inform 
the client of ADR options and, if so instructed, take steps to pursue those options.” Rule 2.01 of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Law Society of Upper Canada define the “competent lawyer” as 
one who, in part, considers the applicability of alternate dispute resolution to the client’s case.
Chapter 11 of Alberta’s Code of Professional Conduct (“The Lawyer as Negotiator”) 
states, “[e]thical rules relating to honesty and integrity are as applicable to 
negotiation as to any other aspect of a lawyer’s practice.” There should be no 
suggestion that ethical requirements such as honesty do not apply or that the 
standards of application are lower in non-traditional than in traditional 
representation. Other rules may not be as easily transferable, however. Take as one 
example, Rule 4.01 of Ontario’s rules which provides that in representing their 
clients, lawyers are required to try to obtain for the client every remedy or defence 
authorized by law. This “zealous representation” rule, typical of those found in 
other law societies’ rules, may not be literally applied even in adversarial 
proceedings; its literal wording, though, is inconsistent with the mind-set with which 
lawyers are encouraged to engage in mediation. It is necessary to temper these 
absolute statements of adversarial practice with provisions that recognize that in 
mediation the objective may be legitimately problem-solving and if so, that the 
lawyer’s advice and approach might be different than if the client were in a win-lose 
adversarial situation.
To whatever extent the existing rules should be modified to acknowledge the 
function of advocacy in the distinct mediation context, even more so do we need to 
consider whether law society rules suit the governance of lawyer-mediators. This, 
and the related issues of who constitutes the client and the nature of the mediator’s 
obligation, constitute the more pressing questions about ethics in mediation.
The Lawyer as Mediator
While some commentators resist the articulation of standards for mediators out of 
concern that codes of conduct will restrict the kind of approach mediation may take, 
it seems clear that the outcome of this debate has been decided: standards are being 
developed, albeit on an ad hoc basis for the most part in Canada. Nevertheless, if 
there must be codes there remains the opportunity to ensure that they are not 
restrictive of style or approach and that, therefore, the choice of governing authority 
reflects a recognition of diverse mediator styles.
Why do these issues even arise? The answer lies primarily in the tendency to 
characterize “evaluative” mediation as the practice of law and therefore as governed 
by legal practice codes. Accordingly, if non-lawyer mediators practice evaluative
mediation, they will be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.4 It also stems 
from the apparently conflicting desires to impose on mediators responsibility for the 
fairness not only of process, but also of any agreement reached by the parties. On 
the one hand, it has been argued that mediators have an obligation to protect the 
parties’ interests (to ensure that they are relatively equal in bargaining power or that 
the agreement that they reach is fair or consistent with legal standards, for example).5 
On the other hand, when mediators are too active, it is argued that they are not 
mediators at all or, at least, that they are engaged in the practice of law.6
In my view, these conclusions reflect an inappropriate understanding of so- 
called “evaluative” mediation, as well as the imposition of an inappropriate 
obligation on the mediator to “police” the parties’ agreements.
Let me first very briefly outline the problem as I see it. Traditionally, mediators, 
often non-lawyers, but increasingly lawyers, have used a variety of approaches to 
assist the parties to resolve their disputes, including a style called “muscle 
mediation.” “Muscle mediators” were and are aggressive, generally have a good 
idea about what the “right” outcome is, are not shy about giving their opinion about
4 Menkel-Meadow has argued that mediator activities ranging from “information giving, to advice, 
prediction and eventually, evaluation, suggestion (of solutions) or decisions (usually non-binding in 
evaluative mediation)... clearly implicates the practice of law:” C. Menkel-Meadow, “Ethics in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyer’s 
Responsibilities” (May 1997) 38:2 S. Texas L. Rev. 407 at 424. Even so, she maintains that law society 
rules do not always “fit” the mediator context: Ibid. at 426. Also see A. Smiley, “Professional Codes 
and Neutral Lawyering: An Emerging Standard Governing Nonrepresentational Attorney Mediation” 
(Summer 1993) Georgetown J. of Legal Ethics 213 who suggests that the American Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct [for lawyers] should be amended to recognize the neutral lawyer-mediator. She 
argues that this approach gives legitimacy to the lawyer-mediator.
5 See, for example, the discussion of the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators developed by the 
American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association, and the Society of Professionals in 
Dispute Resolution by J.W. Cooley in “Mediator and Advocates Ethics” (February 2000) Disp. Res. J. 
73. Also see D. T. Weckstein, “In Praise of Party Empowerment -  and of Mediator Activism” (Summer 
1997) 33:3 Willamette L. J. 501. Weckstein argues that mediation activism contributes to the parties’ 
informed consent and thus to the achievement of one of the “fundamental principles” of mediation, party 
self-determination.
6 See, for example, J.R. Schwartz, “Laymen cannot Lawyer, but is Mediation the Practice of Law?” 
(May-Julyl999) 20:5-6 Cardozo L. Rev. 1715. Schwartz concludes that non-lawyers can engage in 
facilitative mediation, but that “evaluative” mediation must be reserved for lawyers. L. P. Love, ‘The 
Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate,” (1996) 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 937. Weckstein 
acknowledges that “in some situations, mediator activism could interfere with party-determination and 
mediator neutrality, and may even constitute the practice of law,” but that this potential problem can be 
dealt with by “appropriate safeguards:” ibid. at 504.
what a judge might decide and are not hesitant about pushing the parties to reach a 
pre-determined outcome. In fact, muscle mediators have always been considered a 
good choice in cases where lawyers could not convince their clients to be 
“reasonable.” In that sense, then, some might think that this approach helps lawyers, 
not clients. Yet it must be said, sometimes what clients want -  or refuse to accept 
-  is simply not reasonable. Better to settle the matter, even with a little bullying, this 
argument goes, than go to court and have one recalcitrant client vindicated at the 
expense of another recalcitrant client.
“Muscle” mediation or something like it called “evaluative” mediation today lies 
at the heart of the debate about the governance of mediators, as well as who should 
be permitted to mediate. Evaluative mediators, it is said, “give advice, assess 
arguments, and express their own opinions about the disputing parties’ claims;” they 
“assist disputants in reaching agreements by making predictions about likely court 
outcomes and proposing equitable resolutions to the issues in dispute.”7 The 
facilitative mediator, on the other hand, “neither doles out legal advice nor voices 
a personal opinion regarding the parties’ opposing arguments” and does not counsel 
the parties individually,8 although he or she may provide legal information9 and may 
ask properly framed questions designed to persuade the parties to find out how the 
law might apply to them.10 Thus the facilitative mediator might “advise” the parties 
that certain legal guidelines might apply to their dispute (that is, the mediator would 
give the parties this legal information), but ’’would not provide an opinion regarding 
a disputed issue involving interpretation of such guidelines.” Although it is popular 
today to treat so-called “evaluative” mediation as an aberration and facilitative 
mediation as the genuine article, I disagree that the current debate over these 
approaches “has no precedent” and that “mediation was viewed as a wholly 
facilitative process separate and distinct from adjudication.”11 In my experience,
7 Schwartz, supra note 6 at 1733-34.
8 Ibid. at 1731.
9 Ibid. at 1737.
10 For examples under Virginia’s Rules of Professional Conduct, referred to below, see J.W. Cooley, 
“Shifting Paradigms: The Unauthorized Practice of Law or the Authorized Practice of Mediation” 
(August/October 2000) Disp. Res. J. 72 at 74.
11 M.E. Laflin, “Preserving the Integrity of Mediation Through the Adoption of Ethical Rules for 
Lawyer-Mediators” (2000) Notre Dame J. of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 479 at 484. It is equally 
misleading to say that as a general development “mediation as a practice has moved further and farther 
from the facilitative ideal, looking at times no different from neutral case evaluation or settlement 
conferencing:” ibid. at 484-85.
these have always been two of the several styles employed by mediators, sometimes 
in the same mediation. Furthermore, an aggressive mediator using her or his 
opinions to press the parties towards agreement is not transformed into an 
adjudicator.12
Yet particularly since they were defined as analytically distinct categories by 
Leonard Riskin,13 the facilitative and evaluative styles have been held up as “good” 
and “bad” forms of mediation, respectively. Subsequent commentators have either 
criticized Riskin’s analysis and argued that mediation should be viewed along a 
spectrum moving from less to more activist conduct by the mediator14 or have 
maintained that “evaluative” mediation should not be called mediation at all.15 
Someone’s attitude towards “evaluative mediation” is bound to be related to views 
about the nature of the lawyer-mediator’s role and the proper authority to establish 
and govern ethical standards of lawyer-mediators in their professional capacity. 
(The reference to professional capacity is required because the “conduct 
unbecoming” provisions of law society codes of conduct govern members in their 
private and personal capacities and thus would govern members whose professional 
activity is mediation rather than lawyering.)
The options available for governing lawyer-mediator ethics are the law societies, 
mediator organizations which would govern all mediators, and a separate 
organization or set of rules for lawyer-mediators because their activities constitute 
the “cross-practice” of law and mediation.16 Proponents of the third option believe
121 should add, however, that there is a difference between an aggressive mediator with strong opinions 
and the dispute resolution process known as “neutral evaluation,” the purpose of which is reflected in 
its structure: a third-party neutral hears from the parties’ lawyers and gives an opinion about the likely 
outcome of the case. In my view, it is unfortunate that the term of “evaluative” has been given to 
mediation because of the inevitable blurring of these processes.
13 L.L. Riskin, “Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques” (1994) 12 Alternatives to High Cost 
Litig. 111.
14 For example, see J.B. Stulberg, “Facilitative versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the 
‘Grid’ Lock” (1996) 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev 985.
15 See Laflin, supra, note 11 at 487-498 for a concise summary of these different assessments. While 
Laflin concludes at 499 that “[a]ctivist, evaluative approaches to mediation . . .  do pose a significant 
threat to the continued existence of mediation as a separate and distinct form of ADR,” she recognizes 
that it is not realistic to try to treat these approaches as in fact distinct; rather, she says, the focus should 
be on whether the approach taken by the mediator interferes with “the two basic premises of mediation: 
participant self-determination and mediator impartiality:” ibid. at 525.
16 See ibid. for a discussion of this approach.
that lawyer-mediators are likely not only to use their legal skills but also to try to 
control the mediation process and the parties. Assuming the eventuality of official 
regulation of mediation, my current inclination is to recognize that mediation has its 
own diversity of structure and dynamic and among these options, organizations 
governing mediators as a group is preferable. I would be least inclined to support 
law society regulation because of what this choice says about the nature of 
mediation. My purpose here, however, is not to be definitive about this question, but 
rather to raise some points for consideration as we work towards the appropriate 
answers to questions about mediator regulation. We need to avoid a situation where 
the current tendency goes too far to turn back.
Law societies in Canada and the United States have begun to articulate rules 
governing lawyer mediators. Probably one of the most advanced is the state of 
Virginia where recently promulgated rules require mediators to advise parties who 
ask them to use evaluative techniques that such techniques might interfere with the 
parties’ self-determination; permit mediators to use them only if all parties agree; 
and allow them only as a supplement to other forms of mediation.17 This approach 
somewhat resembles that of the Law Society of New Brunswick which (under Part 
5 of the Law Society Act, 1996 which constitutes the Rules of the Society) has 
assumed authority to “regulate members in their practice as mediators and 
arbitrators.” British Columbia has also taken jurisdiction over lawyer mediators. In 
fact, to date, the Law Society of New Brunswick has only made it clear that non­
member mediators, as well as member mediators, may offer legal advice as long as 
it is merely “a corollary” to their mediation services. (I note that “giving legal 
advice” is explicitly included as an aspect of the “practice of law” in New 
Brunswick’s Law Society Act.)
British Columbia’s Law Society has imposed certain qualifications and 
minimum process requirements on lawyer-mediators engaged in family law 
mediation. These provisions are found in the Professional Conduct Handbook which 
defines “family law mediation” in part as “advising the participants of a court’s 
probable disposition of the issue” or “giving any other legal advice.” In contrast, the 
Commentary to the Rule “Lawyers as Mediators” under the Code of Professional 
Conduct of the Law Society of Manitoba states that “the lawyer [acting as mediator] 
shall not give legal advice, as opposed to legal information, to the parties to the
17 C.H. Oates and M. Summerlin Hamm, “A New Twist for an Olde Code: Examining Virginia’s New 
Rules of Professional Conduct” (2000-2001 ) Regent U. L. Rev. 65 at 87. Virginia’s Rule 2.10 is headed 
“Third Party Neutral” but there is a separate rule for mediators (Rule 2:11, Mediator). Also see Laflin, 
supra note 11 at 521-522 who is sympathetic to Rule 2.11 and Cooley who is not: supra note 10.
mediation process.” Ontario Rule 4.07 serves to distinguish the role of the lawyer- 
mediator from the lawyer-advocate by requiring a lawyer-mediator to make it clear 
that he or she is not acting as a lawyer for either party and that the parties’ 
relationship with the mediator is not governed by solicitor-client privilege. The 
Commentary to the Rule suggests that the lawyer-mediator “should not” give legal 
advice and (in common with other provinces’ rules) should advise the parties to seek 
independent legal advice before and during the mediation and in the event that the 
lawyer-mediator prepares a draft contract.
Much of the debate in the United States has centred on two activities which have 
been identified as aspects of the “practice of law”: the application of the law to the 
facts of a party’s dispute and the drafting of complex agreements or contracts. This 
is why a number of American commentators have argued that “evaluative” 
mediation which might involve both activities constitutes “the practice of law.” By 
and large, the Canadian law societies have been more restrained, appropriately so in 
my view, and recognize that giving legal opinions and drafting contracts might be 
a legitimate part of the mediator’s role. Much of the emphasis (although not 
exclusively so) has been on distinguishing the lawyer-advocate’s role from that of 
the lawyer-mediator, thereby highlighting the mediator’s role. This is as it should 
be.
The lawyer acting as a mediator is not engaged as an advocate for a particular 
client. Rather the mediator works together with the parties in a common endeavour, 
with the objective of benefitting all participants, even though this may be 
accomplished by pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of the individual parties’ 
cases. The following questions help illuminate the mediator’s role:
W here is the representative relationship? W here is the duty o f  loyalty? What is the 
fiduciary duty owed by whom and to whom? W here is the understanding o f  a party 
that the mediator is protecting that party’s interests? How can the mediator receive 
confidential information from two parties with adverse interests and be practicing 
[sic] law with respect to either o f  them -  or both o f  them? How can a  mediator 
accept a  service fee from two people with adverse interests, yet be practicing law 
with respect to both o f  them?18
Answering these questions helps to identify the distinct nature of the mediator’s 
relationship with the parties and to clarify both the nature of the mediator’s ethical 
obligations and to whom they are owed. The mediator is not answerable or 
responsible to one party, but to all the parties (and I add here, without further, that
18 Cooley, supra note 10 at 73.
the obligation of a mediator in a mandatory mediation program should be to the 
parties rather than to the body which establishes mandatory mediation). The 
agreement he or she facilitates or even promotes (because he or she has assessed that 
it is one to which both parties will agree) is meant to be in the interests of all the 
parties, not one party. The mediator has no interest in the substantive outcome, and
I say this even of so-called evaluative mediators, except to the extent that a particular 
outcome might attract the agreement of all the parties. These aspects of mediation 
separate the mediator from the lawyers representing clients in the mediation who, 
regardless of their shift in mind set to address the problem as a mutual activity, 
nevertheless are still -  and should be -  representing their clients’ interests.
This is not to say that mediators do not have ethical obligations to the parties. 
They do, in my view, have such obligations both to the parties and to the integrity 
of the mediation process. For example, a mediator’s readiness to make substantive 
suggestions or assess the parties’ proposals should be guided by the extent of the 
mediator’s substantive knowledge or understanding of the dispute. Among other 
responsibilities, mediators must ensure that they are not in a conflict of interest, that 
they treat the parties with respect and that the parties treat each other with respect.
If mediators should be permitted to be activist in orientation and technique 
without raising ethical red flags, as I argue that they should be, what about the 
related question of how protective the mediator must be in order to minimize 
running afoul of ethical standards? To what extent should mediators intervene to 
offset an imbalance in bargaining power or to ensure that an agreement reached by 
the parties is consistent with a pre-determined standard? The short answer to these 
questions -  inadequate to be sure, but nevertheless sufficient to indicate the scope 
of the mediator’s role as I see it -  is that the process requires as equal a bargaining 
power in each party as possible, but at the end of the day, the parties must take 
responsibility for their own agreement. This combination is most consistent with the 
notion of mediation as a process by which parties voluntarily work towards a 
settlement of their dispute satisfactory to them both or towards a transformation of 
their relationship, if that is their goal (as it would be in transformative mediation). 
Effective mediators have tools at their disposal by which they can offset certain 
kinds of imbalances of bargaining power without becoming the advocate of any 
particular party and by which they can assist the parties in assessing any agreement 
they reach for its fairness, enforceability, and other qualities without taking
responsibility for the content of the agreement.19
From this perspective, law society rules are far more unsuited to govern the 
mediator’s role than they are to regulate lawyers acting as advocates in mediation. 
The direction taken in the American literature has obscured the more important 
elements which distinguish the mediation dynamic. For example, the emphasis on 
the mediator’s application of the law to the facts of the parties’ dispute ignores the 
reality that this activity is engaged in by any number of actors who are not 
considered to be practising law, whether they are lawyers or not because o f the 
context in which the activity takes place. These actors include paralegals under 
limited circumstances (although this is a controversial area), arbitrators (although 
they too have been threatened with governance by the law societies and, as 
indicated, have been explicitly taken under the wing of the New Brunswick Law 
Society), investigators and adjudicators at tribunals, union representatives, and even 
some judges. These people are not always required to be lawyers, although there 
may well be reasons why being a lawyer is a requirement of the job in any given 
case. Even so, they may be governed by some other body better suited to their 
particular responsibilities. We need to consider carefully whether this is the case 
with lawyer-mediators.
Conclusion
Mediation ethics must be based on the distinct dynamic which characterizes 
mediation as a practice based on diverse styles and techniques which have 
implications for both the lawyer, who serves as a party’s advocate, and for the 
mediator, including the lawyer-mediator. On the one hand, while lawyers as 
advocates are properly governed by law society rules, it may be time to consider 
whether these rules need to be adapted to the mediation context. On the other hand, 
given the increase in mediation and the development of mandatory mediation, 
lawyers who act as mediators are engaged in a distinct practice which may well 
require regulation since they have ethical obligations to both the parties and the 
process. The distinct nature of mediation, however, suggests that the law societies
191 acknowledge that mandatory mediation and a mediator who is highly activist in encouraging parties 
to reach a particular agreement might raise some issues here but not to the extent that they change the 
basic principle. In my view, one of the most important things a mediator can do is advise parties to 
obtain independent legal advice even if the lawyers are not themselves involved in the actual mediation. 
Mediators’ suggestions, however forcefully put, can be assessed by the parties’ own lawyers. If a party 
cannot afford a lawyer, a mediator needs to take care not to become that party’s advocate or champion 
and not to take advantage of the fact that the party may be more susceptible to her or his suggestions.
are not the appropriate body to govern mediation ethics. Those concerned with 
ensuring that the full benefits of mediation are realized need to address these 
questions before they are answered by default.
